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It has been argued that, when they are acutely hungry, people act in self-protective ways by
keeping resources to themselves rather than sharing them. In four studies, using experi-
mental, quasi-experimental, and correlational designs (total N= 795), we examine the
effects of acute hunger on prosociality in a wide variety of non-interdependent tasks (e.g.
dictator game) and interdependent tasks (e.g. public goods games). While our procedures
successfully increase subjective hunger and decrease blood glucose, we do not find sig-
nificant effects of hunger on prosociality. This is true for both decisions incentivized with
money and with food. Meta-analysis across all tasks reveals a very small effect of hunger on
prosociality in non-interdependent tasks (d= 0.108), and a non-significant effect in inter-
dependent tasks (d=−0.076). In study five (N= 197), we show that, in stark contrast to our
empirical findings, people hold strong lay theories that hunger undermines prosociality.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-12579-7 OPEN
1 Department of Psychology, Justus-Liebig-University Gießen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10D, 35394 Gießen, Germany. 2 Department of Psychology, University of
Hildesheim, Universitätsplatz 1, 31141 Hildesheim, Germany. 3 Department of Psychology, University of Bamberg, Markusplatz 3, 96047 Bamberg, Germany.
4Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, VU Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 5 Institute for
Brain and Behavior Amsterdam (IBBA), Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 6 Department of Experimental Psychology,
University of Oxford, New Radcliffe House, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK. 7Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical
Ethics, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, St Ebbe’s Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK. 8 College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter,
Washington Singer Building, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK. 9These authors contributed equally: Jan A. Häusser, Christina Stahlecker.
*email: Jan.A.Haeusser@psychol.uni-giessen.de; Christina.Stahlecker@psychol.uni-giessen.de
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2019) 10:4733 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-12579-7 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 1
12
34
56
78
9
0
()
:,;
Do people become less prosocial when they are hungry? Dothey share less? Various theories favor the idea that facinglimited resources, or the thwarting of basic needs such as
food to satisfy hunger, brings about a focus on immediate self-
interest1–4. For example, conservation of resources theory5,6
argues that when facing threats, people tend to focus on them-
selves and save their resources. While the idea is compelling, does
acute hunger indeed make people less helpful and cooperative? In
this paper, we address this fundamental question in both non-
interdependent and interdependent settings. Acute hunger due to
temporary deprivation of food is characterized by craving for
food, feeling hungry, and, on a physiological level, decreased
blood glucose levels.
It has been argued that hunger, as a signal of limited resource
availability, reduces prosociality, that is, the willingness to invest
one’s own resources (e.g., money, time, effort) to help others7,8.
Such “pure prosociality” is typically measured in non-
interdependent settings. In such settings, the outcome an actor
A gets exclusively depends on A’s own unilateral decisions, for
example, how many resources to allocate to another person or
a group. A’s outcome, the consequences of the decision, does
not depend on the choices of other agents, and hence, A’s
behavior is not subject to strategic considerations like concerns
over reciprocity. Donating money to a noble cause9 is a proto-
typical example of prosocial behavior in non-interdependent
settings.
One of the most prominent experimental paradigms for non-
interdependent settings is the dictator game10 (DG). In the DG, a
decision maker (i.e., the dictator) receives an endowment, and has
to decide how to split this endowment between herself and
another anonymous participant (i.e., the recipient). Because the
recipient is powerless, the situation is non-interdependent, that is,
the payoff the dictator receives is only dependent on the split of
the endowment that she suggested. As expectations of reciprocity
do not play a role in the DG, the dictator’s behavior is a measure
of pure prosociality11,12. What factors influence the decision to
keep versus share resources in such non-interdependent settings?
As a relevant psycho-physiological influence, hunger might bring
about a focus on the immediate self-interest and might, therefore,
reduce prosociality in non-interdependent settings. Some studies
have started to address this question. Indeed, there is preliminary
evidence in support of the idea that acute hunger increases self-
ishness13–15.
In one study15, food deprivation reduced participants’ inten-
tion to donate money to charity, and in another study13, food
abundance, induced by participants’ consumption of an energy
bar prior to their decisions, resulted in a stronger intention to
donate money to charity. In line with this, there is also tentative
evidence that increased blood glucose levels lead to higher con-
tributions in the DG14. The picture, however, is somewhat
inconsistent, since two other studies found no significant effect of
experimentally manipulated hunger on charitable giving16 or
experimentally manipulated blood glucose levels on the amount
of money participants shared in a DG17. A closer look at the latter
null effect, however, revealed that it was due to two countervailing
effects of blood glucose on prosociality17. A marginally significant
direct effect of blood glucose on the amount of money shared in
the DG is in line with the idea of resource accumulation and
consistent with the previous findings. At the same time, blood
glucose levels were also negatively related to support for social
welfare, which, in turn, was positively related to sharing behavior.
Hence, via this indirect effect, decreased blood glucose may have
led to increased prosociality. This finding could be interpreted in
terms of low blood glucose levels increasing selfish tendencies, but
these are canceled out by maintenance or even strengthening of
prosocial norms.
As summarized above, hunger can reduce prosociality in non-
interdependent settings, though the evidence should be con-
sidered tentative rather than conclusive. Does hunger also
undermine prosociality in interdependent settings? In such set-
tings, the outcome an actor A gets does not exclusively depend on
A’s unilateral decision but depends on the choices of other agents.
Hence, when they are mindful of their own outcomes, in inter-
dependent situations, individuals cannot simply monitor only
their own behavior, but have to consider key aspects of the social
context, for example, their beliefs about the choices other people
will make. Hence, unlike non-interdependent settings, inter-
dependent settings do not measure pure prosociality as the
decisions of an actor A can be influenced by other motives, such
as strategic concerns. A prominent experimental paradigm for
interdependent settings is the Ultimatum Game (UG)18. The UG
is an experimental game with two players. One player, the pro-
poser, receives an endowment and she has to decide how to split
this endowment between herself and the second player, the
responder. The responder, in turn, has to decide whether she
accepts the offer or rejects it. If the offer is accepted, the money is
paid out accordingly. In case of rejection, both players receive
nothing. As opposed to the DG, where the recipient of the
endowment is powerless, in the UG, the proposer has to antici-
pate the reaction of the responder. Hence, a fair offer of the
proposer in the UG can be motivated either by a fairness motive
(i.e., a prosocial motive) or by the fear of an unfair offer being
rejected. (For an overview of a variety of non-interdependent and
interdependent tasks and their payoff structures, see Fehr &
Schmidt19; Kelley et al.20). In interdependent settings, the choice
whether to act prosocially or not also entails strategic con-
siderations and beliefs about the other person’s response20–22.
The effects of hunger on decisions in interdependent settings
could, therefore, be the result of hunger effects on prosociality but
also of hunger effects on strategic decision making. We have
argued previously that humans can compensate for their own
psycho-physiological impairments when the social context
requires them to23. Hence, it is possible that, even if hunger
enhances selfish tendencies, those will not necessarily translate
into decreased prosociality in interdependent settings due to
strategic concerns that also influence the decision.
To the best of our knowledge, only one study16 has investigated
the effects of hunger in interdependent settings. In this study,
Rantapuska and colleagues investigated the effects of experi-
mentally manipulated hunger in two cooperation paradigms.
Their study yielded results that were somewhat inconclusive, with
increased prosociality in one of the tasks and a null finding in the
other one, thus emphasizing the need for further research.
Our research was set out to test the effects of hunger on pro-
sociality using a variety of study designs, different oper-
ationalizations of hunger, and different tasks. We conducted four
studies, two of them preregistered, investigating the effects of
acute hunger and blood glucose levels in non-interdependent and
interdependent settings. Two studies were laboratory experi-
ments, the other two were field studies, using a correlational and a
quasi-experimental approach (Table 1 provides an overview of
the study designs, samples and measures). In a fifth study, we
examined lay theories about the effects of acute hunger on
prosociality.
As non-interdependent measures we used the DG, social value
orientation24–26, social mindfulness27, and a volunteering task28.
Social value orientation (SVO) represents a person’s preference
for (hypothetical) distributions of money between herself and
another person in a set of non-constant-sum DGs29,30. More
precisely, participants have to decide on a series of DG-like
decisions, with different endowments and different distribution
options. The SVO measure extends rational self-interest by
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simultaneously measuring the value people assign to other peo-
ple’s outcomes25,31. SVO has been validated to be predictive of
real-life prosocial behavior, such as donations to noble causes9,32,
and volunteering28,33, as well as costly cooperation in economic
games34–37. Social mindfulness27 refers to the extent to which an
individual’s decisions leave other people in decisional control,
thereby respecting other people’s interest to choose freely for
themselves. Behaving socially mindful can, therefore, be under-
stood as a prosocial act, as it ensures options for the other person
rather than removing options. It has been conceptualized as “low-
cost cooperation”27,38. Volunteering28,33 encompasses the
investment of time resources to benefit others.
As interdependent tasks, we used the UG, the Public Goods
Game39,40, and the Stag Hunt Game41. In the Public Goods Game
(PGG), multiple players can decide whether or not to contribute
to a common pool that is afterwards multiplied by a constant and
then split equally among all players. The prosocial choice is to
contribute everything to the common pool as it increases the joint
outcome. However, freeriding is possible, as the individual out-
come can be maximized by keeping everything for oneself and
still profiting from others’ contributions to the common pool40.
In the Stag Hunt Game (SHG), two players simultaneously decide
between a cooperative, high pay-off, but socially risky option
(‘hunting a stag’) and an uncooperative, low-pay-off, but safe
option (‘hunting a hare’). Hunting the stag, the prosocial choice,
results in a higher pay-off, but only if both players decide to hunt
the stag. The hare, in contrast, can be hunted down independent
of the decisions of the other player, but results in a lower payoff.
In four studies (total N= 795), using a variety of non-
interdependent and interdependent tasks, and different study
designs (see Table 1), we investigate the effects of acute hunger on
prosociality. While our (quasi-) experimental manipulations of
hunger are successful and strong (i.e., increased feelings of acute
hunger and decreased levels of blood glucose), we do not find
significant effects of hunger on prosociality in the individual DVs.
This is true even for decisions incentivized with food rather than
money. Meta-analyses across the different tasks show only a very
small overall effect of hunger on prosociality in non-
interdependent tasks (d= 0.108), and a non-significant effect in
interdependent tasks (d=−0.076). In a fifth study (N= 197), we
find that, in stark contrast to our empirical results, lay people
hold the belief that acute hunger does undermine prosociality.
Hence, while the idea that hunger decreases prosociality seems
compelling, and there has been prior evidence in support of it,
our results indicate that this effect is very weak at best. Especially
in social contexts that convey interdependence, people seem to
respond to the actual or perceived social requirements of the
situation. In conclusion, we suggest that hunger often does not
translate into more selfishness because many situations share
some elements of interdependence − when other people notice
our actions and are able to respond to them.
Laboratory experiments 1 and 2
In Studies 1 and 2, we experimentally manipulated acute hunger.
Participants were randomly assigned to either a hunger condition
or a control condition. All participants were instructed not to eat
anything after 10 pm the previous night until the experimental
session the following day. Participants in the control condition
then received food before completing the tasks. Self-reported
hunger as well as blood glucose levels at baseline (t1) and before
the tasks (i.e., after food consumption of the control group; t2),
were used as manipulation checks. Study 1 (N= 62) was a first
experimental exploration of the effects of hunger in inter-
dependent settings, in which we used a PGG and a SHG.
To rule out the possibility that, in Study 1, effects were too
small to be detected with our sample size, or that the manip-
ulation of hunger and blood glucose was not strong enough, in
Study 2, we used a stronger manipulation of hunger (i.e.,
experimental sessions were scheduled later, and participants in
the control group received a larger amount of sugar) and a larger
sample (N= 103). Again, we used a PGG and, in addition, a UG.
We also included measures of non-interdependent prosociality,
namely SVO, and social mindfulness (see Table 1 for an overview
of the study designs, samples and measures).
Results Study 1 and 2
Study 1 manipulation check. Repeated-measures ANOVAs
showed significant interactions between experimental condition
and time of measurement for both self-reported hunger and
blood glucose levels (subjective hunger: F(1, 60)= 38.41, p <
0.001, ηp²= 0.40; blood glucose: F(1, 60)= 8.15, p= 0.006, ηp²=
0.13). In the control condition, subjective hunger decreased
(Mt1= 4.30, SDt1= 2.25, Mt2= 1.67, SDt2= 1.89), t(60)= 7.11,
p < 0.001, d=−1.34, and blood glucose levels increased (Mt1=
4.38 mmol/l, SDt1= 0.86, Mt2= 5.10 mmol/l, SDt2= 1.09), t(60)
= 2.88, p= 0.007, d= 0.54. As expected, we found no changes in
blood glucose and subjective hunger in the hunger condition (all
ps > 0.25). At t2, subjective hunger was significantly higher (p <
0.001, d= 1.76) and blood glucose was significantly lower (p=
0.044, d= 0.47) in the hunger condition (subjective hunger:
Mt2= 5.09, SDt2= 2.00; blood glucose: Mt2= 4.59, SDt2= 0.64),
as compared to the control condition.
Study 1 public goods game. The amount of money participants
contributed to the common pool in the PGG did not differ sig-
nificantly between the hunger condition (M= 4.52, SD= 2.08)
and the control condition (M= 3.74, SD= 2.22), t(60)= 1.42,
p= 0.162, d=−0.37.
Study 1 stag hunt game. In the hunger condition, 30 out of 31
participants (97%) chose the cooperative option (hunt the stag),
whereas in the control condition, 25 out of 31 participants (81%)
Table 1 Overview of the methods used in Studies 1–4, including samples, design, and predictor variables, as well as dependent
variables (DVs), either in non-interdependent or interdependent tasks
Method Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4
Sample size N= 62 N= 103 N= 267 N= 363
Setting Laboratory Laboratory Field Field
Design Experimental Experimental Correlational Quasi-Experimental
Predictors Induced hunger Induced hunger Natural hunger Natural hunger (before vs. after lunch),
Incentive (food or money)
Manipulation Check Subjective hunger, blood
glucose
Subjective hunger, blood
glucose
– Subjective hunger
DVs_non-interdependent – SVO, social mindfulness SVO SVO, DG, volunteering
DVs_interdependent PGG, SHG PGG, UG – –
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cooperated, χ²(1, N= 62)= 4.03, p= 0.045, φ=−0.26 (n.s. due
to adjusted α= 0.017, see method section for details).
Study 2 manipulation check. Repeated-measures ANOVAs
revealed interactions between experimental condition and time of
measurement for both self-reported hunger and blood glucose
levels (subjective hunger: F(1, 100)= 75.85, p < 0.001, η2p ¼ 0:43;
blood glucose: F(1, 98)= 91.06, p < 0.001, η2p ¼ 0:48). In the
control condition, self-reported hunger decreased (Mt1= 7.40,
SDt1= 1.71, Mt2= 4.42, SDt2= 2.17), t(100)= 9.88, p < 0.001,
d=−1.43, and blood glucose levels increased (Mt1= 4.73 mmol/
l, SDt1= 1.13, Mt2= 7.45 mmol/l, SDt2= 1.91), t(98)= 10.41, p <
0.001, d= 1.34. As in Study 1, we found no changes in blood
glucose and subjective hunger in the hunger condition (all ps >
0.2). At t2, subjective hunger was significantly higher (p < 0.001,
d= 1.41), and blood glucose was significantly lower (p= 0.001,
d= 1.80) in the hunger condition (subjective hunger: Mt2= 7.35,
SDt2= 1.99; blood glucose: Mt2= 4.94, SDt2= 0.57), as compared
to the control condition.
Study 2 public goods game. Contributions to the common pool
did not differ between the hunger condition (M= 5.73, SD=
2.99) and the control condition (M= 6.04, SD= 2.90), t(100)=
0.53, p= 0.597, d= 0.11.
Study 2 ultimatum game. There was no significant effect of
experimental condition on the amounts of money participants
offered to the responder in the UG (Mhunger= 4.49, SDhunger=
1.49; Mcontrol= 4.76, SDcontrol= 1.26), t(94)= 0.941, p= 0.349,
d= 0.20.
Study 2 social value orientation. Due to computer glitches, SVO
values are missing for seven participants. We used an ANCOVA
with SVO angle25 as dependent variable and baseline-SVO as
covariate. We found that hungry participants were not sig-
nificantly lower in SVO (M= 37.14, SD= 8.74) than participants
in the control condition (M= 40.43, SD= 4.29), (1,95)= 3.99,
p= 0.049, η2p ¼ 0:04 (Bonferroni-corrected α-level is 0.008).
Study 2 social mindfulness. We found no significant difference
in ratios of socially mindful choices in the hunger condition
(M= 0.73, SD= 0.16) as compared to the control condition
(M= 0.77, SD= 0.16), F(1,101)= 1.63, p= 0.204, d= 0.25.
Correlational and quasi-experimental field Studies 3 and 4
To increase our confidence in the null findings in Studies 1 and 2,
we decided to conduct two additional pre-registered, highly
powered studies in naturalistic settings. In these studies, we
focused on non-interdependent prosocial behavior for two rea-
sons. First, hunger-induced selfishness should most likely man-
ifest in resource allocation or sharing situations, where it is easy
to give in to selfish tendencies and keep everything for oneself, as
this would have no social consequences. If acute hunger does not
affect prosocial behavior in such non-interdependent situations, it
is less plausible that it will in interdependent situations that
involve social control. Second, for non-interdependent tasks,
there is at least some tentative empirical evidence suggesting
negative effects of hunger on prosociality, whereas there is basi-
cally no conclusive evidence for interdependent tasks.
Therefore, in Study 3 (N= 267), we further investigated the
relationship between subjective hunger and SVO in a correlational
field study. Students completed a short paper-and-pencil survey as
part of their lecture at a German university. In Study 4 (N= 363),
we used a quasi-experimental approach by recruiting participants
in front of a cafeteria right before lunch (hungry) or after lunch
(control). We assessed the effects of hunger on different non-
interdependent measures of prosociality: a measure of SVO, a DG,
and a volunteering task, in which participants indicated their
willingness to participate in a future study without receiving
financial compensation, and the time they were willing to spend.
Subjective hunger was measured as a manipulation check.
We also examined whether a potential effect of hunger is
moderated by the type of incentive. There is evidence that hunger
increases dishonesty only when this directly helps alleviating the
food-deprived state; that is, hungry participants showed increased
cheating to get a snack pack, but not to get monetary rewards42
(see also Orquin & Kurzban43). Other studies15,44, however,
found that scarcity in one domain (food) motivates maintaining
resources in another domain (money). To illuminate this issue,
we varied the type of incentive (food vs. money) in the DG in
Study 4 (see Table 1 for an overview of the designs used in
Studies 1–4).
In a more exploratory manner, in Study 4, we also investigated
whether participants’ state self-control mediates a potential rela-
tionship between hunger and selfishness. It has been suggested
that the depletion of a resource (e.g., food) lowers self-control
capacities, which, in turn, affects other acts that involve self-
control45,46. Other studies support the idea that self-control is
needed to engage in acts of prosocial behavior47,48.
Results Study 3 and 4
Study 3 social value orientation. In a simple linear regression, we
found that subjective hunger did not significantly predict parti-
cipants’ SVO, β=−0.10, t(265)=−1.58, p= 0.116, R²= 0.01.
When entering gender, age and field of studies into the regression
to control for potentially confounding effects, results remained
stable.
Study 4 subjective hunger. Participants before lunch reported
significantly higher subjective hunger (M= 7.74, SD= 1.94) than
participants after lunch (M= 1.84, SD= 1.63), t(361)= 31.48,
p < 0.001, d= 3.30.
Study 4 social value orientation. We found no significant dif-
ference in SVO between participants before (M= 21.51, SD=
10.41) and after lunch (M= 21.95, SD= 10.22), t(361)=−0.41,
p= 0.686, d= 0.04.
Study 4 volunteering task. We first analyzed whether the per-
centage of participants willing to volunteer in a future study
differed between the two conditions, which was not the case
(before: 45%, vs. after lunch: 47%), χ2(1, N= 363)= 0.15, p=
0.696, φ= 0.02. We further looked at the time (in minutes) that
participants were willing to spend (among those who indicated
willingness) as a continuous measure, and again found no dif-
ference (before lunch: M= 45.00, SD= 59.14, vs. after lunch:
M= 39.94, SD= 55.20), t(164)= 0.57, p= 0.569, d=−0.09.
Study 4 dictator game. We conducted a 2 (time of measurement:
before vs. after lunch) × 2 (type of reward: money vs. food)
between-participants ANOVA on the amount of units (i.e., €0.60-
units of an endowment of €6.00 in the monetary condition, or
packs of nuts of an endowment of 10 in the food condition) that
participants allocated to the other person. Our analysis revealed a
significant main effect for type of reward, F(1, 339)= 17.11, p <
0.001, ηp²= 0.05. Participants were more generous when dividing
food between themselves and another person (they allocated on
average 5.29 out of 10 packs of nuts to the other person; SD=
1.94) than when dividing money (M= 4.39 out of 10 €0.60-units,
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SD= 2.12; this translates to an average allocation of €2.63). More
importantly, however, there was neither a main effect for time of
measurement (before vs. after lunch), p= 0.472 (before lunch:
M= 4.78. SD= 2.01; after lunch: M= 4.93. SD= 2.14), nor an
interaction between time of measurement and type of reward,
p= 0.850 (food condition: Mbefore_lunch= 5.19, SDbefore_lunch=
1.85, Mafter_lunch= 5.39, SDafter_lunch= 2.03; money condition:
Mbefore_lunch= 4.33, SDbefore_lunch= 2.10, Mafter_lunch= 4.44,
SDafter_lunch= 2.16).
Study 4 state self-control. Participants before lunch reported
significantly lower self-control (M= 4.86, SD= 1.01) than par-
ticipants after lunch (M= 5.09, SD= 0.93), t(361)=−2.25, p=
0.025, d= 0.24. We further tested whether self-control mediates
the effect of lunch on the dependent measures using a boot-
strapping approach (5000 samples) in the PROCESS macro for
SPSS49. We found no significant indirect effects for any of the
outcome measures.
Complementary analyses
We conducted complementary correlational, meta-analytical, and
Bayesian analyses to provide further specific tests of the effects of
hunger on prosociality.
Correlations with blood glucose levels. We examined whether
blood glucose levels in Studies 1 and 2 were correlated with the
measures of prosociality. In both experiments, blood glucose
levels at t2 (right before participants started with the tasks) were
not significantly correlated to participants’ prosociality in any of
the measures that we included (Study 1: all ps > 0.40, Study 2: all
ps > 0.14; within the two conditions and in the whole sample).
Bayes factors. To further examine whether our findings are
generally in favor of the H0, that is, that hunger has no effect on
prosociality, Bayes factors were calculated50, using JASP51. We
used a default prior (Cauchy scale: 0.707). Table 2 provides the
Bayes factors of all dependent variables of all studies. The Bayes
factors (BF01) indicate the relative likelihood that the data is in
favor of H0 (rather than showing an effect of hunger). We con-
sider a BF01 > 3 as at least moderate evidence in support of H0.
We see in Table 2 that 7 of the 12 tests provide evidence for H0.
Integrated effect sizes. As direction and size of effects differed
between the different outcomes (see Fig. 1 for effect sizes and
confidence intervals of standardized effect sizes of all four stu-
dies), we conducted three meta-analyses to calculate the inte-
grated effects52 for (1) all dependent variables, (2) all dependent
variables from the non-interdependent tasks, and (3) all depen-
dent variables from the interdependent tasks. Positive effect sizes
in Fig. 1 indicate effects in favor of the prediction of decreased
prosociality when hungry. Negative effect sizes indicate increased
prosociality when hungry. The integrated effect size including all
outcomes of the four studies was d= 0.073, 95% CI [−0.024;
0.169]. The integrated effect size including only outcomes of the
non-interdependent tasks (SVO, DG, social mindfulness, volun-
teering) was d= 0.108, 95% CI [0.001; 0.216], and for outcomes
of the interdependent tasks (SHG, UG, PGG), it was d=−0.076,
95% CI [−0.296; 0.143].
Study 5 lay theories about social effects of hunger
In four empirical studies, ranging from controlled randomized
experimental approaches in the laboratory to correlational and
quasi-experimental approaches in naturalistic settings, we found
only very weak evidence that hunger reduces prosociality (and
only in the integrated analysis for non-interdependent settings).
These findings are not consistent with prior theorizing1–6 and
tentative empirical evidence13–15. Still, it is possible that the idea
that acute hunger generally makes people more selfish is quite
compelling, and perhaps even commonly held in society. To test
whether our findings are indeed in contrast to public belief, we
conducted a fifth study examining beliefs laypeople hold about
social effects of hunger.
In an online survey, we described the DG of Study 4—in which
hunger had no significant effect—to participants (N= 197) of
different demographic backgrounds, provided the actual mean
amount of money that was shared in the control (after lunch)
condition (i.e., €2.67) in Study 4, and then asked them to estimate
how much was shared in the hungry (before lunch) condition.
The correctness of guesses was incentivized. We further asked
participants about their beliefs regarding people’s general beha-
vior when acutely hungry and their own behavior when acutely
hungry.
Study 5 results
In the DG in Study 4, we found that participants in the hungry
(before lunch) condition shared on average €2.60, while partici-
pants in the control (after lunch) condition shared on average
€2.67. In Study 5, we provided participants with the mean
amount shared in the control condition as a reference point (i.e.,
€2.67) and asked them to estimate the amount for the hungry
group. We used a one-sample t test to assess whether their mean
estimate of the amount of money shared in the hungry condition
was significantly different from the provided value of 2.67 (con-
trol condition). Participants on average estimated that the hungry
group shared €1.96 (SD= 1.13), which is significantly less than
€2.67, t(196)=−8.83, p < 0.001, d= 0.63. A second one-sample
t-test revealed that their mean estimate for the hungry group
(M= 1.96) also differed significantly from our actual result for
the hungry group in Study 4 (€2.60), t(196)=−7.97, p < 0.001,
d= 0.57.
Also, a clear majority of participants held beliefs that hunger
undermines prosociality. Most participants indicated that they
believed hungry people to be more selfish (79%), less cooperative
(73%), and less helpful towards others (68%). They believed the
same to be true for themselves (62% more selfish, 68% less
cooperative, and 59% less helpful towards others).
Discussion
Does acute hunger undermine prosociality, as prior theorizing1–6
and prior empirical evidence13–15 would suggest? We found that
Table 2 Bayes Factors (BF01). BF01 > 1 indicates that a null
effect H0 is more likely than an effect of hunger on the given
measure (with higher values indicating increasing
likelihood)
Measure Study BF01
PGG_Study1 1 8.48
PGG_Study2 2 1.78
PGG_ merged 1 & 2 8.01
SHG_Study1 1 5.98
UG_proposer_Study2 2 1.84
Social Mindfulness_Study2 2 2.33
SVO_Study2 2 0.83
SVO_Study3 3 1.73
SVO_Study4 4 7.97
DG_main effect hunger_Study4 4 6.85
DG_hunger x resource IE_Study4 4 6.33
Volunteering task_Study4 4 5.13
BF01 < 1 indicates that an effect of hunger is more likely than H0
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laypeople clearly predict individuals to share less with others
when they are hungry (Study 5). However, our empirical results
do not provide support for this general belief. Using a variety of
methods, in both non-interdependent and interdependent set-
tings, we found no differences between people in a hungry and a
non-hungry state in their levels of prosociality, as indicated by
significance tests and Bayes factors. These studies, two of which
were pre-registered, involved experimental inductions of hunger
in the laboratory as well as self-reported hunger in the field. The
integrated effect size including all DVs from our four studies was
close to zero (d= 0.076) and the 95% CI included zero [−0.024;
0.169]. The same was true for the integrated effect size for
interdependent tasks (d=−0.073, CI [−0.296; 0.143]). There was
a very small integrated effect size of d= 0.108, 95% CI [0.001;
0.216] for non-interdependent tasks. Hence, the overall picture
does not point to a general or pronounced detrimental effect of
hunger on prosociality. Only for the integrated non-
interdependent tasks there was, however weak, evidence for the
prediction that hunger decreases prosociality.
How can we explain this discrepancy between past publications
and common belief on the one hand and our findings on the
other hand? A tentative explanation could be that beliefs about
hunger and prosociality are deeply grounded in the widespread
“myth of self-interest”53, a strong belief that people are ultimately
selfish54. As part of this belief, people may also think that indi-
viduals fall back on self-interest when stakes are high. Hence, they
may overestimate the extent to which self-interest rather than
prosocial motives are triggered, when resources are limited.
Moreover, people might underestimate the social context that
dictates cooperation in some cases, even if self-interest was trig-
gered. This might be particularly true for situations that represent
interdependence, as in such situations hunger could not directly
translate into selfishness. Our analyses revealed a—very small—
effect of hunger on prosociality in non-interdependent contexts;
that is, when the outcome an individual receives depends exclu-
sively on her decisions. These are prototypical situations in which
giving in to selfish impulses is not believed to result in reper-
cussions—such as rejection decisions in the UG or increased
selfishness by others in interdependence tasks. Strikingly, even in
such situations, which in our case were also stripped of elements
of social resonance or non-anonymity, we found only a very small
negative effect of hunger.
We suggest that most conflicts between self-interest and pro-
sociality in everyday life entail some degree of interdependence—
a feature captured by the interdependent tasks used in our stu-
dies. For example, in an UG, participants cannot simply reduce
their contributions to protect their resources without increasing
the danger of eliciting a negative response by others that leads to
receiving no rewards at all, when the offer is rejected. The null
findings in these situations might indicate that, even if hunger
increases the urge to acquire more resources, people are still able
to consider their interdependence with others and the strategic
constraints of the situation, which is in line with evidence that
hunger even improves strategic decision making55. In non-
interdependent situations, people might at least be aware of social
norms and might be guided by them in their behavior56, as the
non-significant findings and the only small integrated effect size
for these tasks indicate. More generally, our findings are in line
with the argument that people are able to compensate for their
psycho-physiological impairments when they perceive it as
required by the social context23,57.
The interpretation that hunger increases egoistic impulses that
are suppressed by social requirements is in line with counter-
vailing direct and indirect effects found in Aarøe and Peterson’s17
study. It is also in line with our finding in Study 4 that hunger
significantly reduces perceived self-control, which does not
translate into more selfish behavior. People might perceive
themselves to be less able to control impulses when hungry but, in
the context of social interaction, there is a range of other coun-
tervailing impulses at play, such as fairness or risk of rejection.
The experience of lowered self-control when hungry might even
be a foundation of the lay theories that hunger decreases proso-
ciality, as shown by study 5. Speculatively, people might be able to
accurately judge the impact that acute hunger has on their self-
control, but unable to correctly anticipate the influence of social
factors that maintain prosociality.
We should also note the possibility of hunger effects being
overestimated in published literature. Strikingly, in Study 4, we
found that hunger exerts no effect on selfishness even when the
resource at question is useful to directly eliminate acute hunger,
that is, food rather than money. Looking at the psycho-biological
level, a recent meta-analysis43 suggests that the spectrum and
intensity of behavioral and psychological consequences of fluc-
tuations in blood glucose levels have been overestimated in
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previous research. In line with this, in our studies, we also found
no significant correlations between blood glucose levels and
prosociality.
To avoid misunderstandings, note that we examined hunger in
terms of an acute condition within the upper boundaries of the
natural daily fluctuation typical in Western industrialized socie-
ties (Studies 1 to 4 were conducted with undergraduate student
samples in Germany). The effects of hunger in terms of a chronic,
potential life-threatening state, as a consequence of food scarcity
due to poverty, natural disasters, or war is beyond the scope of the
present paper. Rather, our primary aim was to replicate and
extend previous research and theorizing on the effects of acute
hunger and/or blood glucose on prosociality13–17. All of these
studies used manipulations similar to ours or weaker, for exam-
ple, the application of a carbonated versus non-carbonated soft
drink without prior food deprivation14,17. Most of these studies
reported an effect of hunger or blood glucose on prosociality.
Hence, in terms of reproducibility and generalizability, as well as
in terms of advancement of theory development, we therefore
deem our new evidence in support of the null hypothesis to be
highly informative.
We are fully aware of the qualitative difference between acute
hunger as a non-critical state and chronic hunger as an existential
threat. Nevertheless, we believe that our manipulations assess
non-trivial forms of hunger, as many people in Western indus-
trialized worlds might experience them. For example, our varia-
tions in hunger were validated by strong and consistent effects on
two key aspects of hunger: blood glucose levels (measured in
Studies 1 and 2), and self-reported hunger (measured in Studies 1,
2, and 4). As natural fluctuations in blood glucose are regulated
within a narrow range, even short food deprivation is likely to
cause blood glucose levels to be at the lower boundary of the
regulatory corridor58,59. Notably, we did not detect any sig-
nificant link between levels of blood glucose and degree of pro-
sociality in Studies 1 and 2.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that—
given the strength of our manipulations and the small range of
natural blood glucose levels—our findings provide a first indication
that also severe forms of hunger might not per se undermine
prosociality. From an evolutionary perspective, it could be argued
(albeit speculatively) that shortage of food should even foster pro-
sociality and cooperation. For example, Gurven60 emphasized that
in small scale societies meeting daily food needs is a highly inter-
dependent task. Interestingly, in such societies scarce food resources
even increase prosociality (peaceful sharing) rather than selfishness.
This tendency might be hard-wired as a consequence of mankind’s
long history of cooperative hunting and gathering. Evidence from
evolutionary game theory61 supports the idea that in times of
scarcity (i.e., rare pay-offs), evolution favors strategies that minimize
the risk of not receiving any resources at all rather than strategies
that maximize resources, which also relates to the idea that, when
facing limited resources, people might strive to cooperate.
Taken together, the idea that hunger undermines prosociality
seems a compelling belief, and there has been some evidence in
support of it. However, given the null results that we found, we
conclude that hunger is unlikely to substantially undermine
prosociality. This seems to be especially true in social contexts
characterized by some degree of interdependence. More gen-
erally, our results indicate that people seem to be able to
overcome some state of deprivation and to detect and respond
to the actual or perceived social requirements of the situation.
In conclusion, we suggest that hunger often does not translate
into more selfishness because many situations share some ele-
ments of interdependence − when other people notice our
actions and are able to respond to them. Humans are social
animals, after all.
Methods
Test-power calculation for Studies 1 and 2. To avoid inflation of type-one errors,
levels of significance were Bonferroni-corrected (Study 1: α= 0.017; Study 2: α=
0.008). Test-power calculations (G*Power 3.1.9.2)62 showed that sample sizes of
both studies were sufficient to detect medium to large effects with the adjusted
alphas and power= 0.85. We aimed at examining effects with at least medium size
based on effect sizes (and sample sizes) of earlier research as well as on con-
siderations regarding practical relevance. Of the earlier papers that reported the
predicted effect of hunger on prosociality, only one17 reported effect sizes (or
provided the data required for computing effects sizes). In the first of two studies
resembling our design (Study 1: food deprivation prior to participation with food
consumption in the control condition before measurement of prosociality; though
food deprivation was only for 4 h) the authors found a moderate effect. In the
second study, which used a weaker manipulation of hunger (Study 2: olfactory food
cues in saturated participants), a small to moderate effect was found. The sample
sizes of the earlier studies ranged from N= 58 to N= ~130 (one study13 did not
report the Ns for the relevant conditions). With respect to practical relevance, we
used strong manipulations of hunger and blood glucose levels, that were also
stronger as compared to the earlier studies that reported the predicted effect.
Hence, our manipulations should produce stronger variations in hunger and blood
glucose compared to common fluctuations occurring in industrialized societies.
We, therefore, argue that the commonly occurring fluctuations would be of rele-
vance only if our strong (but still ecologically valid) manipulations produced at
least medium effects. Further, our experimental studies were complemented with
correlational and quasi-experimental studies that were clearly higher powered as
compared to earlier studies (N= 267 and 363, respectively).
Study 1 participants and procedure. Sixty-two undergraduate students (81%
female, mean age= 22.61) were randomly assigned to a one-factorial between-
participants design (hunger vs. control). Experimental sessions were scheduled at
10 a.m. All participants were instructed not to eat anything after 10 pm the pre-
vious night. Baseline measures (t1) of subjective hunger (one-item visual analog
scale: “How hungry are you right now?”; ranging from 0 to 10) and blood glucose
levels (Medisana® MediTouch) were obtained. Next, participants in the control
condition took part in a “tasting experiment” and ate two chocolate puddings (total
sugar 36.75 grams). After a latency of 10 min, subjective hunger and blood glucose
levels were measured again (t2), and participants started the tasks. Participants’
payment was dependent on individual payoffs from the tasks (M= €21.16, SD=
3.01). Study 1 was approved by the local ethics committee of the University of
Hildesheim, Germany. Informed consent was obtained, and participants were fully
debriefed.
Study 1 public goods game. Participants played a one-shot computer-mediated
PGG with two other anonymous participants. Participants received €8 and decided
how much money they wanted to keep for themselves and how much they wanted
to donate to a common pool (in increments of €1). All money donated to the
common pool was multiplied by 1.5 and afterwards split equally among the three
participants. Each participant received the money kept for herself plus one third of
the common pool.
Study 1 stag hunt game. Participants played a one-shot SHG with another
anonymous participant. Participants had to decide between a cooperative, high
pay-off, but socially risky option (‘hunting a stag’) and an uncooperative, low-pay-
off, but safe option (‘hunting a hare’). Hunting the stag resulted in a higher pay-off
(€2.5), but only if both players simultaneously decided to hunt the stag. The hare,
in contrast, could be bagged independent of the decisions of the other player, but
resulted in a lower payoff (€1).
Study 1 exploratory measures. Study 1 also contained a non-social risk task.
Hunger did not affect non-social risk.
Study 2 participants and procedure. In Study 2, we increased both the strength of
the experimental manipulation and the sample size: first, experimental sessions
were scheduled at 12 p.m. instead of 10 a.m. Second, in the control condition,
participants consumed a higher amount of sugar (42 g) with a faster uptake into the
blood stream (grape juice, glucose, and buns). Third, the latency between food
consumption and experimental tasks was increased to 15 min. One-hundred-three
students (67% female, mean age= 24.06) were randomly assigned to a one-factorial
between-participants design (hunger vs. control). Participants’ payment was
dependent on individual payoffs from the tasks (M= €24.43, SD= 2.75). Study 2
was approved by the local ethics committee of the University of Hildesheim,
Germany. Informed consent was obtained, and participants were fully debriefed.
Study 2 public goods game. We used the same procedure as in Study 1, with the
exception that participants received €10 in Experiment 2 to allow for greater variance.
Study 2 ultimatum game. Participants played a UG63, which involves two players,
a “proposer” and a “responder”. First, participants acted in the role of the proposer.
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They received €10 and were asked to propose a division between themselves and
the responder (another participant who would allegedly participate in the study
later). Participants were told that the responder would decide whether to accept or
reject the offer. If the offer was accepted, both the proposer and the responder
would be paid accordingly. If the offer was rejected, both would receive a payoff of
zero. In fact, all participants received a payment according to their offer at the end
of the study, as no future participants decided on these offers. For exploratory
purposes, our participants also played the UG in the responder role. Note that it
could be argued that hunger should increase or decrease the acceptance of unfair
offers. Hunger had no effect.
Study 2 social value orientation. We measured SVO using the 6-items version of
the SVO slider measure25. Participants indicated their preferences for hypothetical
distributions of money between themselves and another person in a set of non-
constant-sum dictator games. High values in the slider measure indicate a more
prosocial orientation. As SVO can be conceptualized both as a trait and a state8,25,
participants filled in the SVO measure twice: during the experiment to determine
the influence of hunger on SVO, and 1 week before the experiment to determine
their baseline social preferences.
Study 2 social mindfulness. Participants completed the social mindfulness task27:
in a series of computer-based trials, they chose between three objects of one
category (e.g., three pens, three wrapped gifts). Two of these were always identical;
the third differed in one aspect (e.g., color). Participants were asked which object
they would choose if another person was to choose after them and the object
chosen was not to be replaced. A choice of one of the two redundant objects was
coded as the socially mindful choice, as it left the hypothetical other person in
control about which object they would get.
Study 2 exploratory measures. Study 2 also contained exploratory measures of
self-reported trust, personality, and moral decision making. Hunger did not affect
any of these measures.
Study 3 participants and procedure. We conducted a power analysis (using
G*Power 3.1.9.262) given a potential participant pool of N= 300, and taking an
alpha of 0.05 and power of 0.80, for a linear regression model with one predictor.
We would be able to detect a small effect of f²= 0.02.
Two hundred and seventy-six students were recruited in four different
lectures at a German University and were asked to fill in a short paper-and-
pencil survey. Nine surveys were returned incomplete, so 267 participants
(79% female, mean age= 22.11) were included in the analysis. Prior to data
collection, Study 3 was pre-registered on the OSF website (https://osf.io/qxa6t/?
view_only=339cbd05be6b44b0b03afed1e09c2c10) and approved by the local
ethics committee of the Justus-Liebig-University Gießen, Germany. Informed
consent was obtained, and participants were fully debriefed.
The survey consisted of demographics, subjective hunger, and SVO in
counterbalanced order to control for possible order effects. Furthermore, we
investigated relationships with tiredness as a separate research question, which is
not subject of discussion here. Participants did not receive any financial rewards.
Study 3 subjective hunger. Participants were asked how hungry they felt at this
moment and indicated their response on a scale from 1 (not at all hungry) to 10
(very hungry). Additionally, participants indicated the time of their last meal. We
used time since the last meal as a second indicator of hunger, which revealed the
same results as our analysis with subjective hunger.
Study 3 social value orientation. We used the six primary items of the SVO
slider25.
Study 4 participants and procedure. We recruited 363 participants (62% female,
mean age= 23.57) in front of the cafeteria at a German University at lunchtime. A
sensitivity analysis (using G*Power 3.1.9.262) revealed that, given our sample size of
N= 363, alpha of 0.017 (Bonferroni-corrected), and power of 0.95, we could detect
a small to medium size effect of f= 0.21 (main effect for hunger).
Participants were on their way to lunch (i.e., entering the cafeteria, n= 179) or
returning from lunch (i.e., exiting the cafeteria, n= 184). They were randomly
assigned to either a monetary reward condition or a food reward condition; hence,
we used a 2 (before vs. after lunch) × 2 (monetary vs. food reward) between-
subjects design with time of measurement (before vs. after lunch) as a quasi-
experimental factor. Prior to data collection, Study 4 was preregistered on the OSF
website (https://osf.io/8n7a9/?view_only=42fcd0af37ca4891a30470e36c729278)
and approved by the local ethics committee of the Justus-Liebig-University Gießen,
Germany. Informed consent was obtained, and participants were fully debriefed.
The survey included demographics, three different measures of prosociality, and a
measure of state self-control. After completing the survey, participants received their
reward based on their decision in the DG (i.e., either money or food, depending on
experimental condition). As in Study 3, we investigated relationships with tiredness as
a separate research question, which is not subject of discussion here.
Study 4 subjective hunger. Participants indicated their momentary hunger on a
scale from 1 (not at all hungry) to 10 (very hungry).
Study 4 social value orientation. We used the six primary items of the SVO
slider25.
Study 4 volunteering task. We adopted a volunteering task from McClintock and
Allison28 assessing participants’ willingness to participate in future psychology
studies without obtaining financial reward. If participants agreed, they had to
indicate the number of minutes they would be willing to contribute (in 15-min
steps up to 300 min).
Study 4 dictator game. Depending on the experimental condition, participants
either received €6.00 (monetary reward) or ten 40 g packs of nuts and dried fruit
(food reward) that they could divide between themselves and an anonymous future
participant. They could allocate money or food to the other participant (i.e., €0 –
€6.00 in steps of €0.60, or 0 – 10 packs of food). They were informed that they
would keep the remaining amount, that they would not meet the other participant
and that their decision would remain anonymous. The donations made in the DG
were paid out to subsequent participants, after their participation. Prior to parti-
cipation, participants were not informed that they would receive additional money
at the end of the experiment. Moreover, participants were not informed that the
future participants would also be in the role of a dictator.
In order to select an attractive reward for the food condition, we conducted an
online pre-test including 216 participants who rated five different snacks. Nuts and
dried fruit were perceived as most valuable among the five snacks (mean estimate=
€0.67 per pack) and were the first choice of most participants (36.6%) when sorting
the snacks according to their preference. In our main study, participants further
indicated how much they liked nuts and dried fruit on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4
(very much), to control for bias due to participants being generous only because of
their food preferences. For the analysis regarding the DG, we excluded 20 participants
in the food reward condition, who indicated that they did not like nuts and dried fruit
at all (response 0 on the 0–4 scale).
Study 4 state self-control. We used the short version of the State Self-Control
Capacity Scale in German (SSCCS-K-D)64, containing 10 items (e.g., “I feel awake
and concentrated”, scale 1= not at all true to 7= entirely true; 8 items reversed).
High values indicate high self-control. Cronbach’s α was 0.85.
Study 5 participants and procedure. We conducted an online study via Amazon
MTurk with N= 210 participants. Thirteen participants were excluded from the
analyses as they failed to answer the attention check correctly, resulting in a sample
of N= 197 (mean age= 37.36, 37% female). Adopting a procedure from Lee,
Frederick, and Ariely65, participants read an accurate description of our Study 4
and were informed about the mean amount of money that was shared in the DG in
the after lunch (control) condition (i.e., €2.67). We then asked participants to
estimate the mean amount of money that was shared in the before lunch (hungry)
condition (given possible values between €0.00 and €6.00). They received an
additional bonus of $0.50 for accurate estimates (i.e., within a 20% range around
the actual result for the hungry group).
Subjects were then asked three questions on how they thought people in general
would behave when hungry (“Do you think people are more or less selfish/
cooperative/helpful when they are hungry?”), and afterwards, how they thought
they themselves would behave when hungry (“Do you think you are more or less
selfish/cooperative/helpful when you are hungry?”). Each question had three
possible choices (i.e., “more selfish/cooperative/helpful”, “no difference”, “less
selfish/cooperative/helpful”). Participants were paid according to US American
minimum wage. Prior to data collection, Study 5 was pre-registered on the OSF
website (https://osf.io/3cvnz/?view_only=aadb4be8238844d68867180057ec91f8),
reviewed and approved by the University of Oxford’s Central University Research
Ethics Committee, with the reference number MS-IDREC-R56657/RE001.
Informed consent prior to participation was obtained.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this paper are available on the OSF website (https://
osf.io/zexd7/?view_only=480593713c904397a033e751a6da7a69).
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